In this paper we study empirically the labor market of economists. We look at the mobility and promotion patterns of a sample of 1,000 top economists over thirty years and link it to their productivity and other personal characteristics. We find that the probability of promotion and of upward mobility is positively related to past production. However, the sensitivity of promotion and mobility to production diminishes with experience, indicating the presence of a learning process. We also find evidence that economists respond to incentives. They tend to exert more effort at the beginning of their career when dynamic incentives are important. This finding is robust to the introduction of tenure, which has an additional negative ex post impact on production. Our results indicate therefore that both promotions and tenure have an effect on the provision of incentives. Finally, we detect evidence of a sorting process, as the more productive individuals are allocated to the best ranked universities. We provide a very simple theoretical explanation of these results based on Holmström (1982) with heterogeneous firms.
Introduction
Contract theory has proposed various solutions to reconcile a principal and an agent who have con ‡icting objectives and to provide the agent incentives to exert e¤ort. The standard answer has been to pay the agent according to his production in a static contracting context (see e.g. Holmstrom, 1979 ).
However, a small area of this literature has emphasized the importance of dynamic interactions between an individual and the market. Repeated interactions facilitates learning about the agent's talent by observing noisy signals (Jovanovic, 1979) and can also provide a solution to the moral hazard problem (Fama, 1980; Holmstrom, 1982) .
There has been growing interest recently in the theory and evidence of dynamic incentives and careers in organizations. Unlike static incentives, which are explicitly stated in a contract, dynamic incentives are often implicit: they re ‡ect the concerns of economic agents for their career, as revealing their talent to the market will allow them to extract higher rents in the next periods.
The …rst paper to introduce career concerns -also called implicit incentives -is Fama (1980) . Departing from the classical static models of the contracting literature, he considers a dynamic setting explaining how the managerial labor market -both within and outside the …rm -disciplines the behavior of a manager in term of incentives. For the market, present performance acts as a signal about the talent of the agent and thus about future performance. Because managers are concerned about their reputation, they will be induced to exert e¤ort. Holmström (1982) formalizes this intuitive idea. In his model, a competitive labor market assesses the unknown talent of an agent via his performance, which is also a function of his e¤ort and a stochastic noise. In the beginning of each period, the agent is paid his 1 expected productivity, partly determined by the market belief about his talent. The market updates its belief every period and, as time elapses, gives less weight to new information. As a consequence, the agent exerts e¤ort to in ‡uence the assessment of the market about his talent, but as the returns to e¤ort decrease with experience, incentives also become weaker with time and therefore e¤ort declines with experience 1 . Gibbons and Murphy (1992) propose an extension that allows for explicit incentives. They show that implicit and explicit incentives are substitutes: wages should be more related to performance when dynamic incentives are weak. Tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) considered in a dynamic context generates similar results (Rosen, 1986; Lazear, 2003) but models hierarchies and promotions explicitely. Promotions generate incentives ex ante but these diminish after the promotion. One way to keep e¤ort high is to increase the wage gap along the hierarchy.
Because of the assumptions that talent is equally valued in all …rms and that the market is competitive, the career concerns and tournament theory literature do not consider inter-…rm mobility explicitly. Jovanovic (1979) stresses the importance of learning to explain job mobility. In his model, an agent is endowed with some unknown characteristic: the match existing between him and the …rm he belongs to. This contrasts with previous models where the unknown variable was only speci…c to the individual. There is a learning process about the match via the observation of individual performances, which are function of the match and a noise. In this model, there 1 Another e¤ect is that young managers may be tempted -if they are risk averse -to engage in herding behavior so as to avoid to give a wrong signal about their talent to the market in the beginning of their career (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990 ). This herding behavior due to career concerns has been a major concern of papers investigating empirically implicit incentives.
2 are no concerns about e¤ort and moral hazard problems. The agent is paid his expected productivity. The major di¤erence between this model and the ones described above is that the agent will respond to the signalling in term of turnover: he will keep the same job until he thinks that he can …nd a better match somewhere else. Time also plays a role in Jovanovic's model: the probability of separation, due to the learning process, decreases with experience.
Learning and manipulation of beliefs are likely to be widespread across all classes of economic activities where skills are highly valuable and segmentation by skills is present. Yet, to date, empirical studies have been scarce and focused on …nancial activities using data from CEOs, fund managers and security analysts. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) analyze wage dynamics, using a sample of around 3000 CEOs over the period 1971-1989 and they …nd that wages are more sensitive to performance as individuals come closer to retirement. This is consistent with the idea that static incentives should be more important when dynamic incentives become weaker. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) look at the relationship between termination and performance using a sample of 453 mutual fund managers during the years 1992-1994.
They …nd that a manager's probability of being terminated is negatively related to performance and that termination is more performance sensitive for young managers. Moreover they show that young managers might have an incentive to herd, as they are more likely to be terminated if unsystematic risk deviates from the mean of the fund's objective group. Hong et al. (2000) analyze the relationship between career concerns and herding using data of 8421 security analysts between 1983 and 1996. They also …nd that termination is more performance related for less experienced analysts, and that young analysts herd more than their older counterparts. Hong and Kubik (2003) extend the analysis and look at upward and downward mobility.
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They …nd that more (less) accurate analysts are more likely to experience a move to a more (less) prestigious …rm.
We extend the literature by analyzing career concerns in the academic profession. Learning about individual ability through publication should play an important role in explaining promotion patterns within departments.
Moreover, we do not only focus on mobility along the hierarchy of the …rm, but we also look at mobility across …rms, as our database allows us to track people even when they leave the …rm.
Another recent strand of the literature has analyzed individual career paths in a …rm's internal labor market where workers are shielded from the outside At …rst mostly descriptive, this new literature has developed theories integrating various building blocks models to better understand the complex reality observed in …rms. Empirical work so far has been limited to a small amount of studies describing the internal labor market of a single …rm.
This branch of the literature has …rst been mainly empirical and descriptive and has focused on issues very close to the ones that we analyze here.
The pioneer work can be found in Doeringer and Piore (1971) , their central idea being that the internal organization of the …rm is shielded from outside.
The main consequences are that the hierarchy remains stable over time and workers follow well-established career paths; wages are more attached to jobs than individuals; and …rms restrict movements between the inside and the outside labor market to a limited number of jobs [there exist ports of entry and exit in the job structure]. This topic has been left aside by economists for more than twenty years and raised again only recently by Lazear (1992) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994a,b) . Both studies look at the internal structure of one single …rm by analyzing the wage structure and the career path of the workers inside the …rm. While they con…rm the presence of a stable hierarchy over a long period of time, and the existence of careers inside the …rm, they do not …nd much evidence of ports of entry and exit, and mixed evidence that wages are attached to jobs, suggesting the existence of a learning process about ability. This is further con…rmed by the …nding that wages and promotions are serially correlated, the latest being evidence of systematic fast tracks. This set of new facts have given rise to new models of internal labor markets. Gibbons and Waldman (1999a) explain a large amount of these facts by integrating various building-block models: job assignment, on-the-job human capital acquisition and learning.
In the academic labor market, job assignment is a less crucial element than in …rms, as individuals do the same job in all ranks. On the other hand, learning and human capital acquisition are likely to be as important. We add in dynamic incentives as an additional building block in our empirical analysis, as suggested by Gibbons and Waldman (1999b) .
Our database allows us not only to look at the careers of individuals inside …rms but also at careers between …rms. While we do not have information on individual wages (we only have average wage by rank) and our sample does not contain the entire population of a given …rm, our approach is very complementary.
We also contribute to the small literature studying the e¤ect of research productivity on mobility in the academic labor market (Ault et al., 1979 (Ault et al., , 1982 Long, 1978; Allison and Long, 1987) . These studies typically …nd no or a small e¤ect of productivity on upward mobility, and document instead a pedigree e¤ect on promotion and a departmental e¤ect on productivity.
However, these studies consider only individuals who change university, and therefore do not treat the mobility decision as endogenous. Moreover, they do not consider promotions explicitly. We use a large sample of top economists and analyze the relationship between performance and both university 5 change and promotion, explicitly linking our results to the theories of learning and human capital acquisition.
Most studies interested in testing the e¤ect of performance on pay or career evolution are confronted with the -often impossible -task of …nding individual productivity data, and to relate this variable with the personal characteristics and career path of the agents (see e.g. Lazear, 2000) . The advantage of taking top economists as an object of study is that these data are relatively easy to obtain. Economists usually post their CVs on their personal website, so that one can easily extract personal information such as the year of promotion to professor or the university where one graduated.
Information about research productivity is available through bibliographic databases such as Econlit. Moreover, jobs along the hierarchy are easily identi…able and standard across "…rms".
We link promotion and mobility patterns of economists to their productivity and evaluate how the sensitivity of promotion and mobility to productivity evolves with experience and with academic positions. We also analyze the dynamics of individual productivity along the career, testing whether faculty exert less e¤ort after being promoted. In addition of looking at incentives, we also try to determine if mobility leads to sorting of individuals across universities.
We …nd that the probability of promotion is positively related to past production but also that the sensitivity of promotion to production diminishes with experience. We get a similar …nding for upward mobility: the change in quality of the institution when an economist switches university is dependent on his production and production becomes less and less important for mobility as the individual becomes more experienced. We …nd that economists respond to dynamic incentives: e¤ort is higher at the beginning of the career, when dynamic incentives are strong. This …nding is robust to the introduction of tenure, which has an additional negative ex post impact on production. Our results indicate therefore that both promotions and tenure have an e¤ect on the provision of incentives. We also detect the presence of a sorting process as the more productive individuals are allocated to the more productive universities. To link our empirical results to theory, we build a very simple model that generates incentives and sorting based on Holmström (1982) career concerns model with heterogeneous …rms.
Our analysis has two important limitations. First, we are not able to consider the various job dimensions of economists in our dynamic analysis and concentrate instead on research. Our emphasis on research is probably less problematic within our sample as the top economists are likely to be employed in institutions that consider research as the most important task.
These other tasks are more di¢ cult to measure. To try to correct for this weakness, we examine how teaching di¤ers according to the rank and the research quality of the university for a cross-section of individuals. We …nd that teaching is slightly lower in the higher ranks and in the best universities but these di¤erences are small, suggesting that teaching is distributed relatively homogenously. Unfortunately, we are not able to control for the other tasks such as administrative or editorial duties. Second, we have no information about individual wages, which would have provided further evidence about the learning process, but also would have improved the understanding of promotions and mobility, as we would have been able to observe the wage di¤erences associated with internal and external mobility. However, existing evidence shows that average wages increase along the hierarchy and with the quality of the university (see e.g. our companion paper, Coupé et al., 2003) so that on average, promotions and upward mobility are likely to be associated with a wage premium.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes our dataset and provides summary statistics. In section III, we analyze the promotion decision. In Section IV, we turn to the mobility issue. In Section V, we look at the dynamics of productivity along the career and examine whether individuals respond to dynamic incentives. Section VI analyzes more particularly the e¤ect of the tenure sytem. Section VII presents a theoretical explanation of our results and concludes.
Data
Our dataset consists of a combination of various sources. The …rst one is the bibliographical database EconLit. EconLit keeps record of all publications from 1969 onwards in the most important journals of the profession 2 .
The publication is linked to each author, who is linked (since 1990) to the university to which he is a¢ liated at the time when the paper was accepted.
We extracted the entire information contained in the 2000 version of EconLit and aggregated publications by year and by individual. One interesting and very important feature of this dataset is that we are able to follow the individual productivity of economists and of universities on a year-by-year basis, that we will use as measure of individual performance in terms of research.
The dataset can also be used to create a worldwide ranking of individuals over a given period. All rankings are typically criticized on the subset of journals that they consider and how a publication is weighted depending on the quality of the journal where it was published. There is a large dose of subjectivity associated with these choices. To deal with this criticism, we have selected 12 di¤erent weighting techniques which have been widely used in the literature, and we have used the average of the rankings based on these 12 di¤erent measures to determine an average ranking of individuals (see Coupé, 2000) . We also follow the literature by correcting the weight of a publication for co-authorship, dividing the weight of the paper by the number of authors. Using this technique, we identi…ed the 1000 top economists for the period 1987-1998.
As a second step, we collected information about the career of these 1000 top economists by downloading their vitae from their personal websites 3 . We kept only those individuals for whom we could clearly identify the entire career since the year of PhD. This was the case for 652 individuals. Economists post their vitae homogenously and we were able to …nd the year of PhD, the university of PhD, the rank, the employer and the year of promotion. However, very few economists indicated the year when tenure was awarded, despite the importance of this information, especially in the North American market. Moreover, research represents only one of the tasks for which economists have to exert e¤ort, the others being teaching, administrative duties and possibly consulting. This is not the case for the teaching information. We received 415 answers, implying an answer rate of more than 60%, a very satisfactory …gure.
Finally, the career information from the web search and the survey were matched to the publication information from EconLit. By de…nition, our sample is not representative of the whole population of economists. Why did we decide to focus on the top economists in a …rst stage? First of all, it was easier to …nd information about these individuals.
Sample description
Second, we asserted that top researchers were likely to have interesting mobility patterns. In any case, we do not try to generalize our results to the economic profession.
Our sample also di¤ers from the internal labor market literature as we do not focus on one single …rm, but rather compare career paths of individuals in a labor market where talent can be argued to be hardly …rm speci…c and where …rms value the same skills. There are pros and cons of this approach.
A big advantage is that we follow individuals when they leave the …rm, and that we know the past employment history of the individual, even outside the …rm. A disadvantage is that we only have a limited sample of individuals, as opposed to the entire population of a …rm 5 . 5 In a companion paper (Coupé et al., 2003) , we use information of a cross-section of the entire population of individuals working in the 107 economic departments ranked by the NRC in 1995 to test which theory is the best suited to explain the wage structure along the hierarchy. We are not able to use the wage data in the present paper because they are aggregated by rank and thus not suited for a study of individual careers.
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The appendix provides the summary statistics about the dependent and independent variables used in our analysis. Experience is de…ned as the number of years since an individual obtained his PhD. The mean level of experience is 11.6 years. However, there is a considerable amount of heterogeneity in our sample: in 1998, three individuals had more than 50 years of experience and are still considered in our sample, while …ve have only 5 years of experience and are already considered in our sample (see table 1 ). Table 2 shows that around 65% of our sampled individuals obtained their Ph.D. from a subset of only ten universities, the MIT accounting for 15% of the Ph.D.'s awarded.
Current and past research productivity To control for the quality of the publications, various schemes have been proposed in the literature 6 .
We indicated already that we selected 12 di¤erent methods to select our individuals. However, in our econometric analysis, we use only a subset of these measures. The more objective and also most frequently used way to judge the quality of a publication is based on the expected citations of a paper published in a given journal. The …rst measure is the number of publications weighted by the impact factor of the journal. The impact factor is equal to the citations in year t to the articles published in journal J in t 1 and t 2 divided by the number of articles published in J in t 1 and t 2. This re ‡ects the number of citations that can be expected for an article published in J, measured one to two years after publication. This impact factor is available for 273 journals and made available on CD Rom.
However, this method has been criticized based on the fact that many non economic journals are present in the database and that the hierarchy based on reputation is not respected 7 . Therefore, we also use the adjusted impact methodology proposed by Laband and Piette (1994). Their index is based on 4 years of data (1990 citations to articles published between 1985 and 1989) and considers only economic journals in a stricter sense. The disadvantage is that this adjusted index is only available for 121 journals 8 .
We divide the Laband and Piette (LP) adjusted index by 100 for ease of interpretation. Our results are robust to the di¤erent weighting schemes used.
On average, economists in our sample publish the equivalent of 0.4 article by year in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) according to the impact factor weight (0.8 according to the LP corrected impact factor weight).
However, the most proli…c scholars were able to publish the equivalent of In our econometric analysis, we want to assess whether research productivity a¤ects internal and external mobility and …nd evidence of learning, and so we need a measure of past productivity. We use two di¤erent measures of performance in t 1: a short run past performance and a long run past performance. The …rst one is the the sum of weighted past publications for a period of three years, from year t 3 to t 1. The second is the past cumulative history of the individual, i.e. the sum of weighted publications from 1969 to t 1.
However, it is not clear whether it is important to lag our productivity measures because of the well recognized publication lag that changes the 7 This is less likely for our subset of economists since they were selected as the most productive based on 12 di¤erent weighting schemes. 8 For a list of journals and weights see http://homepages.ulb.ac. be/~tcoupe 12 timing of observing research productivity. While the market is likely to evaluate individuals on the basis of their CVs, forthcoming publications are also taken into account for promotions and job o¤ers. Therefore, we adapt our two measures to control for publication lags. Our short run past performance variable controlling for publication gap is the the sum of weighted past publications from year t 1 to t + 1 and the long run past performance variable controlling for publication gap is the sum of weighted publications from 1969 to t + 1.
Job categories and promotions: According to the information provided on the CV, we de…ne 5 di¤erent job categories, 4 of them being related to the academic world. Based on the US system, assistant professor is noted as 1, associate professor as 2, professor as 3 and endowed professors as 4. We applied an equivalence rule for the non-US institutions, although most non-US economists tended to indicate the US equivalent on their CV. Category 5 includes individuals working outside the university sector (central banks, private …rms and international institutions). This is another speci…city of our dataset and of the academic profession: jobs are easily de…ned and standardized across universities.
We de…ne a promotion as a upward switch within the university system (from category 1 to 4). We observe 1,156 promotions over the period. The most frequent types of promotions are hierarchical: 465 are promotions from assistant to associate professor, 406 from associate to full professor and 196 from professor to endowed professor. It is not very clear whether we should consider the latter type of promotion in our analysis because not all universities have endowed chairs. We also …nd the same results if we do not allow a switch from professor to endowed professor as a promotion, and our results do not depend on it. Therefore, we stick with our classi…cation. Tenure is awarded at di¤erent stages of the career. In many universities, it goes automatically with the promotion from assistant to associate professor. Others take more time to select individuals and wait a few years after that. In general, the higher the quality of the university, the latter in the career comes the tenure decision.
Teaching Unfortunately, we are not able to use the information about teaching behavior in our econometric analysis, because it refers to the aca- One disadvantage is that these papers only ranked US universities, except Hirsch et al. (1984) . This means that for the early periods before 1990, we are not able to identify very precisely upward or downward moves from one European university to another. This is a minor di¢ culty because of the high percentage of individuals working in the US, but we should keep it in mind for the interpretation and representativeness of the results. Another criticism against this ranking is that they are biased in favor of universities that have strong research oriented business schools, as it is di¢ cult to distinguish between business school economists and economic departments economists. To properly address this concern, one would need the evolution of the composition of economic departments and to our knowledge, this information is not available 10 . Moreover, many top economists are often a¢ liated to both the business school and the economic departments. Table 3 shows the evolution of rankings and university production over a relatively long period, from 1970 to 1998 for the top 20 departments. Some stylized facts emerge from the data: Chicago and Harvard have persistently remained at the top, while more dynamics is present among the followers.
Production on a 5-year period appeared to have increased for the top departments. Following this pattern, we divide universities in seven di¤erent categories: the top 2 (category 7, Chicago and Harvard), the close contenders (category 6, those ranked between 3rd and 9th), the contenders (category 5, between the 10th and the 24th position), the upper middle ranked (category 4, those ranked between 25th ad 49th), the lower middle ranked (category 3, between the 50th and the 100th), the low ranked (category 2, between the 100th and 300th position) and the very low ranked (category 1, those under the 300th position).
Individual mobility While internal labor market considerations are an important aspect of the academic labor market, another contribution of the paper is that we also consider the external labor market, i.e. the mobility from one university to another. Mobility can be driven either by the individual looking for a better employment opportunity, or by the …rm, which could consider that the individual is not a good "match"and therefore does not want to keep him.
University changes occur more rarely than promotions: the average university change rate is 6.7%. Table 4 provides the distribution of the number of university change by individuals along their career. Some move a lot: 19 individuals move more than three times. The university change rate varies along the hierarchy: full professor in particular move much less than assistant and associates (table 5) . This is an indication about the "up-or-out" nature of the academic labor market, and the fact that individuals become better matched with time.
Outside mobility can also described as going upward, downward or to a similar university. We de…ne an upward move (U P ) as a move to a university of a higher category, a downward move (DOW N ) as a move to a university of a lower category, and a neutral move (EV EN ) as a move to a university of the same category. The distinction can only be made when the category of the university is known. On average, we …nd roughly the same rate of upward and downward mobility (2%). The rate of neutral moves is slightly lower (around 1.4%). We also construct a more informative variable of mobility by looking at the di¤erence between the category in t and the category in t 1 (DCAT ).
The internal and external labor markets explanations might be related, as an individual can accept a place at a university with a lower reputation if he gets a promotion. We therefore computed the percentage of university changes that go together with a rank change and vice versa: 27% of promotions are accompanied by a change of university; 44% of university changes are accompanied by a promotion. Promotion is more likely for associate professors changing universities (61%) than for assistant professors (54%), and professors (24%).
Promotions
We want to analyze how the assessment of individual talent by the market evolves through time. We …rst regress the probability of promotion on short run past productivity (SRP ERF ), short run past productivity interacted with experience. We will use four di¤erent measures of short run past productivity, as explained in the previous section.
We also add a number of controls: experience, experience squared, the number of years since last promotion (Y SLP ), the position before the change (ASST stands for assistant professor and ASSOC for associate professor).
We run a probit regression:
where
Theory would lead us to expect a positive sign for 1 and a negative sign for 2 , indicating that production matters for promotion but that the information provided by the production becomes less and less important with time.
In order to see how the assessment of productivity evolves as the individual goes up the ladder, we also interact the productivity variables with the type of promotion. We therefore run a similar regression:
Productivity should have a larger e¤ect on the probability of promotion at the beginning of the career. It means that we expect the e¤ect to be more important for promotion from assistant professor to associate professor, than for promotion from associate professor to full professor, and the least e¤ect should be for promotions from full professor to endowed professor
We start with estimating Eq.(1). Results are provided in tables 6A
(using impact factor weights) and 6B (using LP corrected impact factor weights), where we report the marginal changes and not the coe¢ cients of the probit regressions. In column 1, we observe that production is positively related to the likelihood of promotion. Moreover, production interacted with experience has a negative e¤ect: this appears to indicate that performance becomes less informative on the talent of the agent as he becomes more We also used duration analysis (see e.g. Kiefer, 1988 for a survey) to look at the determinants of the duration of a stay in a given rank. We used a discrete time proportional hazard model (Prentice and Gloecker, 1978 ) and obtained similar results 11 . 1 1 In a previous version of the paper, we also tested whether the time spent as assistant professor has an in ‡uence on the time spent as associate professor and …nds a negative relationship, i.e. evidence against systematic fast tracks.
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Another channel through which career concerns are likely to play a role is the outside option. Individuals might decide to exert e¤ort not in order to be promoted, but in order to attract attention of higher ranked (and/or better paying) universities. On the other hand, departments might consider that an individual that they hired is not su¢ ciently well matched with the …rm.
In that case, he would have to …nd a job in another university, looking for a better match. We use three di¤erent measurements of change in university quality. In our …rst speci…cation, we estimate the determinants of the probability of upward mobility (U P ), i.e. the probability that an individual moves to a university in a higher category. As in the previous speci…cation, our main interest lies in the e¤ect of production on upward change and whether the sensitivity of upward change to production decreases with experience.
In this setting, we use the cumulative production of the individual as a measure of performance. This variable re ‡ects the entire research history of the individual.
Another way to formulate this hypothesis is to say that the probability of a downward move DOW N (a move to a lower ranked university) is negatively related to past performance. This variable is close to the termination variable used in Chevalier and Ellison (1999) .
In addition we also consider a more precisely de…ned variable of the di¤erence of quality. In a third speci…cation, we use the change of category as the variable to be explained. We run in that case an ordered probit regression:
We …rst estimate Eq. (3) and run a probit regression on the probability of moving up to a better university (col. 1 in table 7 ). Production has a positive but small e¤ect on the probability of moving upwards. Production interacted with experience has a negative e¤ect on the likelihood of upward mobility. Again we interpret this …nding as evidence of the career concern theory: the information provided by the production of the agent becomes less valuable as he gains experience and as the market evaluates the talent better and better. Previous category has a negative sign, indicating that it is more and more complicated to go upward.
As we expected, results for downward mobility (column 2) are reversed:
past performance has a negative e¤ect on the probability of going to a less prestigious university, but the e¤ect becomes less important with experience.
Finally, when analyzing the change in category (Eq. 5), we …nd once again that production explains mobility, but less and less as experience increases (column 3). Naturally, upward mobility appears to be less likely the higher the reputation of the university.
In line with the matching theory, we also see that the likelihood of mobility decreases with experience, except for Eq. (4), although at a decreasing rate, what could be explained by a "end-of-career" e¤ect.
Results are similar using the LP corrected impact factor. Controlling for publication gaps, results are also comparable, except for DOW N , where publications and publications interacted with experience are no longer signi…cant.
The E¤ect of Dynamic Incentives on Productivity
As a next step, we analyze whether these incentives have an e¤ect on the behavior of economists. How sensitive is worker behavior to incentives?
Does the agent exert more e¤ort at the beginning of his career? To test this, we regress the production of individuals on the rank, the category of university where the economist work, experience and experience squared. To control for the publication lag, we lag the individual rank and the category of the university by two years.
Production in this case is simply the publication in year t weighted by the impact factor. Results with the adjusted impact factor were comparable.
CAT ij is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual i works in a university of category j and 0 otherwise.
So far we have detected the presence of a Bayesian learning process through which the market tries to assess the talent of the agents, supporting the existence of dynamic incentives. The next logical step is to analyze whether these incentives have an e¤ect on the behavior of economists.
We estimate Eq. (6) using simple OLS. Results are presented in the …rst column of table 8. Performance appears to go up as one goes up the ladder, and individuals in more prestigious universities tend to produce more.
However an important aspect of our paper is that past production serves as an instrument of sorting and learning: an important component of productivity is the talent of the individual, which might be correlated with the rank and the category of university of the individual. We allow for unobserved heterogeneity (# i ), which might be correlated with our explanatory variables (" it = # i + it , it N 0; 2 ) and use a …xed e¤ect model. This speci…cation assumes that there are …ve components to productivity: pure talent to publish, e¤ort, a on the job human capital acquisition component, an externality component and a noise. Talent is represented by the …xed e¤ect. We use rank dummies to test the idea that e¤ort is declining along the career. To distinguish this strategic e¤ect from aging e¤ect, we control for on the job human capital acquisition by adding experience and experience squared (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967) . Externality is represented by the university category dummies. Finally, there is pure noise representing luck.
Results are supporting our hypothesis that e¤ort is higher in the begin- incentives provide an explanation for the Peter principle, i.e. performance declines after promotion. In addition of using category dummies, we also used the category itself as a variable, as well as the productivity of the university (as presented in table 3) and university dummies. Using the latter variable, we also found evidence of an externality e¤ect. University productivity in t 2 had a positive e¤ect on individual productivity, but the e¤ect was smaller in the …xed e¤ect regression than in the OLS regression, suggesting that sorting was still present. Finally, production increases with experience, but at a decreasing rate, in line with human capital theory.
We checked whether our results could be explained by the composition of our sample. Indeed, an alternative explanation could be that individuals who are still assistant or associate professors in 1998 are also more productive on average because they are included in the sample, despite the fact that they have not been present on the market over the period. To control for this possibility, we only used data for those individuals who had become professors before 1998 and found similar results.
The E¤ect of Tenure on Productivity
Tenure is an important component of academic life, especially on the North American labor market, where it is awarded only when the university con-25 siders having the right match with the candidate. The tenure system has important consequences on the sorting of individuals, through the up-or-out selection scheme. However, tenure can also have a negative ex post disincentive e¤ect, similar to a promotion. As some have pointed out, tenure is probably the most important promotion in academic life.
Therefore, we adapt the methodology of the previous section to test the e¤ect of tenure on production. Moreover, adding tenure as an additional variable allows us to test the robustess of our previous results. The equation to be estimated is similar to Eq. (6) with the exception that a dummy variable T enured is added, equal to 1 if the individual was tenured in t 2 and 0 otherwise:
Results in table 9 are comparable to those of table 8 . Therefore, our previous results are robust when we add the e¤ect of tenure. Promotions still have an incentive e¤ect even when controlling for the existence of tenure. We see however that the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients between assistant an associate profesors has been reduced, which suggests that part of the reduction of dynamic incentives for associate profesors is due to the fact that many of them are tenured. Indeed, we …nd the unsurprising result that tenure has an additional negative e¤ect.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the labor market for a sample of top economists by linking promotion and upward mobility to research productivity.
We have found evidence that production was positively related to promotion and upward mobility but decreasingly with experience, in line with the career concern literature. Learning about talent leads to the allocation of individuals inside the …rm and between …rms.
We have found also that economists respond to dynamic incentives: effort is higher at the beginning of the career when incentives are stronger.
Sorting and matching appear to play an important role as well: over the career, individuals are allocated to universities according to their respective productivity.
Our results can easily be explained in a simple model like Holmstrom (1982) but where …rms di¤er in their ability to attract …nance, itself being a function of reputation. As a consequence, they can "a¤ord"to hire di¤erent types of individuals.
We provide a sketch of the model. There are two types of …rms (sectors),
A and B, and two periods. Both types of …rms set standards but at a di¤erent level. Type A …rms set a standard equal to #, while type B …rms set the standard at #. Think of these two types of …rms as serving di¤erent segment of the market: for example, type A …rms are more teaching oriented and type B …rms more research oriented. Both types value talent equally.
However, type A …rms have a …nancial constraint. They can only a¤ord to pay the agent until #. Type B …rms have no cash constraint. Individuals are initially allocated to …rms based on the expected talent m i0 = E (# i ).
Production of the agent is the sum of talent, e¤ort and a noise.
where " N 0; 2 " i.i.d. and # N m 0 ; 2 # . Assume the individual is initially allocated to a type A …rm. After one period, …rms observe y i1 and update their beliefs:
, z i1 = y i1 a 1 and a 1 is the level of e¤ort anticipated by the …rms.
If the new expected value of talent E (# i j z i1 ; a 1 ) falls below the threshold #, the individual leaves …rm A, leaves academia and gets an outside Second, exactly like in Holmstrom's model, e¤ort declines with experience, as …rms learn about the talent of individuals. In period 2, the agent exerts no e¤ort. In period 1, the agent selects e¤ort so as to maximize expected utility:
where g(a t ) is the cost of e¤ort, g0 > 0; g" > 0.
The model can easily be generalized to n > 2 periods and j > 2 types of …rms. The main results remain unchanged. First, learning implies real-location of workers. Second, learning also implies that reallocation becomes less likely with time. Third, e¤ort decreases with time.
We have neglected a series of issues. Maybe the most important is the multitasking aspect of the academic activity. Research output clearly only represents one aspect of the job of an academic and other activities -as teaching, administrative duties, consulting, and political activities -have to be taken into account. We argued that top economists are more likely to be employed in institutions that emphasize research. Moreover, our summary statistics using current cross sectional information suggest that teaching diminishes along the career. Therefore, it can not be the case that di¤er-ences in the number of teaching hours are an explanation for the decline of e¤ort along the career. This is not necessarily true for the other activities, especially for administrative duties. This possibility raises the issue of the optimal allocation of tasks along the career for academic scientists (see Smeets, 2003 for a theoretical analysis).
Other interesting issues for future research are whether there is serial correlation in wages and promotions in the academic world, and whether career concerns are associated with herding behavior, although this issue is probably less important than in …nancial activities. I llin o is -U r b a n a 2 3 6 6 .4 1 9 O h io S ta te 9 6 2 .0 6 1 9 L S E 8 5 8 .7 7 2 0 M in n e s o ta 2 1 0 0 .8 2 0 I llin o is -U r b a n a 9 4 4 .2 3 2 0 M in n e s o ta 8 0 7 .4 7 S o u r c e : N ie m i ( 1 9 7 5 ) , G r a v e s e t a l. ( 1 9 8 2 ) , H ir s c h e t a l. ( 1 9 8 4 ) , S c o tt a n d M itia s ( 1 9 9 6 ) a n d C o u p é ( 2 0 0 0 ) Note: marginal changes for the probit regression, coefficients for the ordered probit; standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* denote resp. signiÞcance at 1%/5%/10% 
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T a b l e 3 : r e s e a r c h p r o d u c t i v i t y o f t h e t o p 2 0 r e s e a r c h d e p a r t m e n t s i n e c o n o m i c s ( n u m b e r o f p a g e s i n t o p j o u r n a l s a d j u s t e d f o r s i z e )
